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Abstract
This paper discusses how the economic structure and asset ownership
shape economic and political outcomes. Using a simple model of the
productive sector, I provide theoretical evidence that complementarities
between productive assets reduce the stakes of political competition, and
therefore reduce the intensity of the conflict over political power. In par-
ticular, these results provide a theoretical explanation for the frequent
conflicts associated with abundant mineral resources. They are valid in
a democratic setting, where this competition is electoral, but also in any
other setting, where competition may be of a more violent nature. I then
extend this analysis to show that complementarity of productive assets
positively influences the willingness of elite groups to invest in property
rights institutions, thus providing an economic explanation for why some
countries have endogenously developed a context more favorable to busi-
ness than others.
Keywords: complementarity, political economy, property rights, conflict
JEL classification: H10, O10, Q34
1 Introduction
Recent advances in the political economy of development emphasize how crucial
the quality of institutions is for economic development. In particular some
suggest that the economic structure and asset ownership have a decisive role in
shaping institutions and development outcomes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008;
Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2009, 2010). The
celebrated case of the natural resource curse exemplifies such considerations.
Resource-rich developing countries seem to be unable to successfully convert
their exhaustible resource into long-term growth and asset accumulation (see
van der Ploeg, 2011, for a recent survey). They also display more frequent
and more violent conflicts (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Fearon, 2005), and poorer
institutions (Bates, 2007). Several mechanisms explain how extractive activities
can produce relatively worse economic outcomes, but why they should encourage
rent-seeking behaviors, corruption, violent conflict over rent-appropriation and
discourage investment in state capacity remains an open question. This paper
offers a theoretical explanation for the conflictual nature of mineral extraction,
and indeed extends the discussion to any other productive endeavor.
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Most economic activities involve two or more actors, characterized by their
ownership (or rather here, control) of a productive asset. Here, I explore the
consequences of asset ownership and of some characteristics of the production
process on the likelihood and intensity of a conflict between the actors involved,
and on their incentive to invest in state capacity. This allows me, as an illustra-
tion, to provide some new insights into the particularities behind two African
success-stories. First, a very specific social context at independence accounts
for the unequaled achievement of Botswana, which transformed its huge dia-
mond wealth into a stable democracy and an impressive growth record (Harvey
and Lewis, 1990; Tsie, 1995). Second, the textile industry and sugar cultivation
transformed ethnic diversity in Mauritius into an opportunity and provided the
ground for its peaceful, yet outstanding economic development, against very
unfavorable odds at independence (Meade, 1961).
For that purpose, this paper provides a simple framework to examine the eco-
nomic determinants of political competition. It therefore fits in recent strands
of the literature, and it contributes in particular to the growing body of studies
which emphasize the role of institutions in the development process (Hall and
Jones, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al.,
2005). Its focus is on institutions designed to protect property rights (Rodrik,
1999).
Specifically, individuals in a position to mobilize resources may find it prof-
itable to invest in a common productive endeavor. This productive endeavor is
described by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, in
order to study the role of asset complementarity or, oppositely, substitutability
in political and economic outcomes.1 The individuals have conflicting interests
over the proceeds of this endeavor, even though they often find it profitable
to involve the other in the production by offering him a share of the proceeds.
Whose sharing preferences prevail is decided through a competitive political
process. Political competition is modeled as a contest game2 between two such
individuals willing to spend in order to have their own sharing preferences pre-
vail. For each contestant, the stake of political power results from the different
shares that he and the other would offer.3 Finally, actual implementation of the
sharing rule depends on the quality of property rights institutions.
The model yields three main results. I first show that more substitutable
1Supermodular games may look as an alternative to this setting; they would however not
lead to the results I am providing here. They offer a tractable framework for comparative
statics, and indeed I use a variation of Topkis’s theorem in the proof of Prop. n◦6, but here
complementarity is one of the variables of interest. For a thorough review of supermodular
games, see Vives (2005).
2This is an unusual, if not unheard of, approach: most models of the influence of special
interest groups over political competition are variations on classical electoral rules. For in-
stance, Robinson et al. (2006); Acemoglu et al. (2004) consider an economic rent accruing
to the group in power, which allows them to buy off their competitors or voters. Contest
games focus more specifically on the costs and benefits of individuals who derive an economic
advantage from political power. To my knowledge, prior to this paper, only Aslaksen and
Torvik (2006) used a contest game to model the political competition in a rentier economy.
In order to compare civil war with democracy, they claimed that a contest game could only
account for an armed civil conflict. Their claim is contentious, however, as contest games can
be argued to account for at least some important features of any form of the political selection
process.
3Technology is assumed to be independent from the political outcome, and both individuals
have an identical objective function. The only organizational role and influence of the winning
individual is setting the sharing rule.
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assets result in higher stakes of political competition. The underlying intuition
comes back to the definition of complementary assets: an asset is complementary
with another if its investment increases the profitability of investing the other.
The contest winner is willing to offer the other contestant a higher share of
the proceeds of the common productive endeavor when the two assets are more
complementary, in order to induce him to invest more. Sharing rules offered by
both contestants would therefore be increasingly favorable to the other when
complementarity increases, thus lowering the stakes of political competition.
The second result is the key result of the paper, and comes as a corollary of
the first one: it establishes the link between the stakes of being in power and
the intensity of political competition. Intuitively, the more the individuals have
to gain from being in power, the more they are willing to spend in order to win
the contest. It is reasonable to assume that the amount of wealth spent for the
conquest of political power is a good proxy for the intensity of political conflict.
As a consequence, my second theoretical prediction is that conflict over political
power is likely to be more intense if the resources to be invested are substitutes,
as in the case of the exploitation of mineral resources.
Once in power, the contest winner has a strong interest in ensuring the
other’s participation in the common endeavor; but he may fail to convince the
other that he would not renege on his promises. The third result establishes that
greater complementarity of assets would be an incentive for this political leader
to commit to uphold the sharing rule – indeed to uphold property rights. Despite
its cost, the commitment mechanism (which can take the form of several formal
institutions; classic ones are conditionalities imposed on Official Development
Aid and an independent judiciary system) is therefore more likely to arise at
times when and in places where assets are complements. Both the leader and
the other actor benefit from the leader’s ability to commit.
Closest to this paper are Bourguignon and Verdier (2009, 2010). They study
the effects of the economic structure of society, namely the complementarity of
the productive resource controlled by the elite and those controlled by other so-
cial groups, on taxation, redistribution, and investment in state capacity. But
while I share their initial intuition about the essential role of the economic struc-
ture of society, the present paper explores different political and institutional
outcomes, thanks to a new framework. More generally, this paper builds upon
the relatively recent literature in the field of political economy of development,
led by Daron Acemoglu and co-authors. In particular, Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2006b) focus on the economic determinants of regime change, in particular
from elite control to democracy, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a, 2008) offer
models of institutional persistence and change and the linkage from political to
economic institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2002b); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
convincingly claimed that previous population density and settler’s mortality
have durably influenced the property rights institutions in former European
colonies; Acemoglu et al. (2002a) go so far as using institutions to shed light on
the idiosyncratic development narrative of one country, describing the custom-
ary legacy of independent Botswana as crucial in its stability and development.
Yet they overlook what may indeed have been key in avoiding the resource
curse in Botswana.4: the interaction between individuals decisive in the fields
4Botswana did not avoid the Dutch disease (Dele´chat and Gaertner, 2008). But the growth
of the diamonds sector compensated and concealed the forsworn industrial growth.
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of both economics and politics (the economic structure of society). The issue
of the effect of leaders on development outcomes was addressed only recently
(Jones and Olken, 2005, 2009; Besley et al., 2011), and remains under investi-
gation.5 However, even though it only appears implicitly throughout the paper,
the assumption that the political contest opposes individuals with control over
economic resources is crucial to my argument (Silve, 2012).
Another related strand of works is the growing body of literature on the de-
terminants of state capacity. This literature focuses on one dimension of state
capacity: fiscal capacity, defined as the ability to raise taxes (Besley and Pers-
son, 2009; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2009; Ca´rdenas and Tuzemen, 2011). A
notable exception is Besley and Persson (2010): they also consider a regula-
tory dimension of state capacity. They are in fine interested in accounting for
property rights, but focus on a rather unorthodox definition of property rights
enforcement: the regulatory capacity of the state is presented as the extent to
which individuals can pledge their assets as collateral. In this paper, I will con-
sider property rights enforcement in a perspective which is more frequent in the
literature (Jones, 1981; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2001), as
protection from state predation. In a way, state capacity is here studied as the
state’s ability to restrain itself.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section I examine a simple
productive framework where one individual sets the sharing rule of a common
endeavor; I also provide a normative assessment of his decisions. In section 3, I
consider a political contest over the privilege of setting the sharing rule. Therein
are the two first theoretical results of the paper. In section 4, I introduce the
possibility that the individual in power may renege on the promised sharing
rule. Since this is anticipated by the other, he may find it profitable to invest
in a costly commitment mechanism (third result). In section 5, I consider the
history of two outliers of cross-country growth regressions, to illustrate how they
fit my story. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The economic model
The economy, restricted to its productive sector, is composed of two decision-
makers A and B. They each control a different productive asset in quantities
RA and RB . Generically, A and B are individuals, and one’s asset is his own
labor, but the model extends to groups who have solved the collective action
problem, individuals in a position to mobilize others’ assets, and it also extends
to other categories of productive assets, such as capital, skilled vs. unskilled
labor etc. A and B are thus assumed to describe the economic structure of
society. Assets can be used either in specific productive endeavors, described by
technologies fA and fB , or in a common productive endeavor, described by f ,
which all produce an identical consumption good. Total production is therefore
Y = fA(xA) + fB(xB) + f(xA, xB), where (xA, xB) ∈ [0, RA] × [0, RB ] is used
5This new literature assumes that certain leaders are “better” for development or at avoid-
ing conflict. In the context of developing countries, political leaders are generally assumed
to seek personal enrichment rather than ideally fostering widespread and inclusive growth.
Benevolent leaders might however indeed be a part of the answer: political leaders both in
Botswana and Mauritius were unanimously commended for avoiding conflict and fostering de-
velopmental policies. As an assumption, however, benevolence is unsatisfactory, as it teaches
little to other developing countries, and has little predictive power.
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for the common production while (RA − xA, RB − xB) is used in the specific
productive endeavors. This setup ensures that participation in the common
production cannot be taken for granted and has to be made enticing; other-
wise, they can invest in their specific activities, which will be assumed not to be
taxable throughout the paper. In other words, the specific production function
offer an outside option to both individuals. They are described by constant re-
turns technologies: ∀k ∈ {A,B}, fk(xk) = γk(Rk − xk). To study the effects of
substitution or complementarity, the common productive endeavor is described
by a CES function:6 f(xA, xB) = γ
(∑
k µkx
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
. µA and µB = 1−µA are
technological parameters; γA, γB and γ are efficiency parameters, and finally
σ > 0 is a substitution parameter7 between the two factors in the common pro-
duction technology. Low values of σ correspond to more complementary assets;
as σ grows, resources are more and more substitutable. For simplicity, I will
thereafter only consider assets with an elasticity lower than 2, but the whole
range is considered in the appendix.
Two parameters recurrently arise in the computations. First, Γi =
γ
γi
σ−1
µσi
can be interpreted as the profitability of investing i’s asset (implicitly: in the
common endeavor) relative to using it for the specific production. For σ > 1,
i’s asset is said to be profitably invested in the common productive process
rather than in i’s specific alternative when Γi is high. For σ < 1, i’s asset is
profitably invested when Γi is low. The complementarity between the two assets
ensures that investment of one makes the common endeavor more profitable to
the other. Γi characterizes only the intrinsic profitability of investing i’s asset,
before taking into consideration investment of the other. Second, endowments
are therefore usefully characterized by the parameter βi =
µiR
σ−1
σ
i∑
k µkR
σ−1
σ
k
; a high
βi in [0, 1] indicates abundance of i’s asset relative to j’s, taking into account
that the common production function may require more of one asset than of the
other.
2.1 Feasible investments
The proceeds of the common endeavor are shared between both individuals,
according to a sharing rule described by (αA, αB), with αA + αB = 1. The
utility of individual i is given by Ui(xA, xB , αi) = fi(xi) + αif(xA, xB). The
problem verifies the necessary concavity conditions, and utility maximization
provides me with the expressions of the two individuals’ best responses to each
other’s investment:
x∗i (αi, xj) = min[Ri, ηixj ] with ηi =
(
µj
µi
Γi
α1−σi − Γi
) σ
σ−1
. (1)
For a given xj , ηi increases with the relative profitability Γi of the common
endeavor and with αi. It decreases with σ. (0,0) is the unique and stable Nash
6These assumptions entail no loss of generality, and despite their accounting for mostly
corner solutions, it is the only choice that makes the model explicitly computable.
7It is the elasticity of substitution
d ln(xB/xA)
d ln(∂Af/∂Bf)
.
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equilibrium iff ηAηB < 1.
8 Graphically, this provides me with four situations9
(cf. Fig n◦1), with one stable Nash equilibrium (x∗∗A (α), x
∗∗
B (α)) each. Upon
choosing α, a social planner may face a choice between implementing several
of these equilibria: for instance, a small αA (and thus big αB) may lead to
full investment of B’s asset but partial of A’s, while a big αA may produce the
opposite outcome. A range of αs might all implement full investment of both
assets. I define feasibility of a situation as existence of an α leading to investment
decisions by both individuals generating that situation in equilibrium.
xA
xB
RA
RB
x∗B
x∗A
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
xA
xB
RA
RB
x∗B
x∗A
{
x∗∗A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
xA
xB
RA
RB
x∗A
x∗B
{
x∗∗A = 0
x∗∗B = 0
xA
xB
RA
RB
x∗A
x∗B
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
Figure 1: Four possible Nash equilibria resulting
from different values of the parameters.
Lemma 1. Feasibility of the various investment equilibria is usefully described
by four ranges of parameters:
• if both assets are profitably invested in the common endeavor, full invest-
ment of both assets is feasible. In this range, full investment of either asset
and partial investment of the other is always feasible;
• if neither asset is profitably invested, no sharing rule can lead to any in-
vestment in the common endeavor;
8Considering ηA and ηB to be functions of αA, the equation ηAηB = 1 can be shown to
have 0, 1 or 2 solutions in [0, 1]. When it has two solutions, I will refer to them as α1 and α2,
with α1 < α2. When it has only one solution, I will refer to it as α1 or α2 by continuity. The
motivated reader will find details in the appendix.
9plus the two situations arising from αi ∈ {0, 1}, which can be defined by continuation and
have obvious investment consequences.
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• the two previous cases define adjacent ranges, and unambiguously define
two complementary ranges. In each of these ranges, one asset is prof-
itably invested while the other is not. In the corresponding range, only full
investment of the former asset and partial of the latter is feasible.
ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1βA
{
x∗∗A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B ≤ RBor{
x∗∗A ≤ RA
x∗∗B = RB
βB
ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1
{ x∗
∗
A
<
R
A
x
∗∗ B
=
R
B
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B ≤ RB
or{
x∗∗A ≤ RA
x∗∗B = RB
βB
βA
Figure 2: Feasibility of the various non-(0,0) situ-
ations (left: σ < 1, right: σ ∈]1, 2[); shaded, no
nonnul equilibrium
Lemma n◦1 characterizes the domain of implementation of each equilibrium.
It is illustrated by Fig. n◦2. The first range can be characterized by the full in-
vestment threshold :
∑
k
βk
Γk
1
σ−1 ≤ 1, and the second by the no investment thresh-
old :
∑
k Γ
1
2−σ
k ≥ 1. The two thresholds are tangent for ΓjΓi =
βi
∑
k Γ
1
2−σ
k
Γ
1
σ−2
j
.10 This
lemma provides interesting insights. Rather obviously, i’s asset is more readily
fully invested when i finds the common endeavor profitable (for σ > 1, Γi high
enough, and the converse for σ < 1). Investment of one asset makes investment
of the other more profitable. This positive spillover is higher if the two assets
are more complementary. As a consequence, as complementarity increases, the
share that each individual demands in order to fully invest decreases, and the
range of parameters for which both assets are fully invested increases. Con-
versely, the more the two assets are substitutable, the higher the share one
individual demands in order to fully invest.
One last observation deserves a mention: for any σ < 2, there is a range
of parameters (
∑
k
βk
Γk
1
σ−1 ≤ 1 and ∀k,Γk < 1) in which neither asset, if alone,
would be invested in the common productive endeavor, but in which the two
assets can be profitably invested together (this is not true anymore for σ ≥ 2).
2.2 Optimal sharing rule
Assume it is one of the two individuals’ privilege – A’s for instance – to set the
sharing rule. He faces a trade-off between enticing B with a fair share of the
10This is not true anymore for σ > 2, thus giving rise to slightly more complex considera-
tions. All cases are considered in the appendix.
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common endeavor and keeping as much for himself as possible. Formally, his
program can be written:
max
αA,αB ,xA
UA(xA, xB , αA)
s.t.
 αA ∈ [0, 1]αB = 1− αA
xB = x
∗
B(αB , xA)
(2)
The previous analysis remains valid. Therefore A’s program can be simpli-
fied to setting α so as to maximize his indirect utility VA(α) = fA(x
∗∗
A (α)) +
αAf(x
∗∗
A (α), x
∗∗
B (α)): it is a nonconstant continuous function, and therefore has
a maximum in [0, 1], with maximand αA = (αAA, α
A
B).
Prop. 1. A’s optimal sharing rule is usefully described by four ranges of pa-
rameters:
• if both assets are profitably invested, A offers αB = βBΓB
1
σ−1 , which results
in full investment of both assets;
• if B’s asset only is profitably invested, A still invests part of his own asset,
and offers αB = 1− α2 so as to induce full investment of B’s;
• if A’s asset only is profitably invested, he still finds it profitable to offer
B to participate. He offers αB = 1 − α1 for ΓB over a threshold, and
αB < 1− α1 under it. He fully invests his own asset;
• if neither asset is profitably invested, setting a sharing rule is pointless.
ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1βA
 x
∗∗
A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
αB = 1− α2
 x
∗∗
A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
αB = 1− α1

x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
αB =
βB
ΓB
1
σ−1
βB
{
x∗∗A = 0
x∗∗B = 0
ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1
  x
∗∗ A
<
R
A
x
∗∗ B
=
R
B
α
B
=
1
−
α
2
 x
∗∗
A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
αB ≤ 1− α1

x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
αB =
βB
ΓB
1
σ−1
{
x∗∗A = 0
x∗∗B = 0
Figure 3: Equilibria resulting from A’s optimal
choice of sharing rule (left: σ < 1, right: σ ∈]1, 2[).
Prop. n◦1 characterizes A’s choice of sharing rule for any value of the param-
eters. It is illustrated by Fig. n◦3. When B’s asset is profitably invested (for
σ > 1, ΓB high enough, and for σ < 1, ΓB low enough), A benefits from having
B fully invest his asset, and he maximizes his own share conditional on inducing
full investment from B. When B’s asset is not so profitably invested, setting
a sharing rule only makes sense if A’s asset is profitably invested. Assuming
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it is, A always sets the sharing rule so as to maintain his own full investment.
Among possible such sharing rules, he does not maximize his own share, as he
benefits from B’s investment. If the complementarity between their assets is
high enough (σ ≤ 1), in fact, in the set of such sharing rules, he offers B the
highest share available. The complementarity effect is more efficient from his
point of view than the appropriation effect. If the complementarity is interme-
diate (σ ∈]1, 2[), he only offers B the highest share available if ΓB is not too
low. If ΓB is too low, A may find maximizing B’s share too costly at some
point. Instead, he offers him an intermediate share.11 A corollary to Prop. n◦1
is that investment of both assets, as a result of A’s choice of sharing rule, is
nondecreasing in σ.
2.3 Normative benchmarks
How does A’s offer compare to a hypothetical social planner’s program? A
social planner with full control of asset allocation would simultaneously choose
xA and xB to maximize Y . Formally, her program can be written:
max
xA,xB
Y (xA, xB)
s.t.
{
xA ∈ [0, RA]
xB ∈ [0, RB ]
(3)
Prop. 2. “First-best efficient” asset allocation
The social planner’s investment decision can be characterized by four ranges
of parameters:
• she invests nothing (xA = xB = 0) if the two assets are jointly not prof-
itably invested;
• she invests fully both assets (xA = RA, xB = RB) if they both are suffi-
ciently profitably invested;
• otherwise, one asset i is profitably invested. She invests this asset fully
(xi = Ri), and the other partially (xj =
(
µi
µj
Γj
1−Γj
) σ
σ−1
Ri).
Prop. n◦2 characterizes the Y -maximizing program of a unique individual
in control of both assets. It is illustrated by Fig. n◦4. This individual’s in-
vestment decisions reflected the investment decisions which followed from A’s
optimal sharing rule decision (as described by Prop. n◦1) when and only when
σ = 1. The no-investment threshold is described by the equation
∑
k Γk = 1;
and the full-investment threshold by mink Γk = βk. Even when σ = 1, however,
A’s program also entailed distributional consequences which are meaningless
here. In particular, notice that when both assets are profitably invested, A and
11For higher values of σ (σ > 2) and low ΓB , A does not wish to share the benefits of
the common endeavor at all: the cost of motivating B is too high relative to its benefits. In
that range, he sets his own share to 1; this discourages the other from investing at all. But
since investing in the common technology (even though he is alone) is more beneficial than
investing in his own specific production opportunity, he invests all his own asset. He is less
willing to sacrifice a share of the production as substitutability increases or as the other asset
becomes scarcer, since the additional benefit anticipated from its investment decreases. Cf.
the appendix
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ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1βA
βB
{
xA = RA
xB < RB
{
xA < RA
xB = RB
{
xA = 0
xB = 0
{
xA = RA
xB = RB
ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1βA
βB
{ x A
<
R
A
x
B
=
R
B
{
xA = RA
xB < RB
{
xA = RA
xB = RB
{
xA = 0
xB = 0
Figure 4: First-best efficient asset allocation (left:
σ < 1, right: σ > 1).
B would each set a different sharing rule (to reach the same investment deci-
sions). A contrario, when σ 6= 1, investment decisions based on an individual’s
program are inefficient (in terms of production maximization) for several ranges
of parameters. There are two separate factors which generate this inefficiency:
first, as there are no transfers here, the Coase theorem does not apply here, and
A’s interest may sometimes not coincide with production maximizing. Second,
even in the perspective of production maximization, when investment decisions
are decentralized, each agent does not value the positive spillovers his invest-
ment generates on the other’s. To study the latter factor, let me examine the
program of a social planner who would control the sharing rule, and not directly
asset allocation:
max
α
Y (xA, xB)
s.t.

αA ∈ [0, 1]
αB = 1− αA
xA = x
∗∗
A (α)
xB = x
∗∗
B (α)
(4)
Prop. 3. “Second-best constrained” asset allocation
The social planner’s choice of sharing rule can be characterized by four
ranges of parameters:
• whenever full investment is feasible, that is when both assets are jointly
profitably invested, she sets any αA ∈ [ βAΓA
1
σ−1 , 1 − βBΓB
1
σ−1 ] to induce full
investment of both;
• if no investment is feasible, that is if neither asset is profitably invested,
setting the sharing rule is pointless (xA = xB = 0 anyway);
• otherwise one asset is profitably invested. If it is A’s, she sets αA = α1 so
as to maximize investment of B’s asset, while ensuring full investment of
A’s. If, conversely, it is B’s, she sets α = α2.
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ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1βA
 x
∗∗
A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
αB = 1− α2
 x
∗∗
A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
αB = 1− α1

x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
αB ∈ [ βBΓB
1
σ−1 , 1− βAΓA
1
σ−1 ]
βB
{
x∗∗A = 0
x∗∗B = 0
ΓB
0 ΓA
1
1
  x
∗∗ A
<
R
A
x
∗∗ B
=
R
B
α
B
=
1
−
α
2
 x
∗∗
A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
αB = 1− α1

x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
αB ∈ [ βBΓB
1
σ−1 , 1− βAΓA
1
σ−1 ]
{
x∗∗A = 0
x∗∗B = 0
βB
βA
Figure 5: Second-best asset allocation with property
rights (left: σ < 1, right: σ ∈]1, 2[)
Prop. n◦3 characterizes the Y -maximizing program of a social planner hy-
pothetically in charge of setting the sharing rule. It is illustrated by Fig n◦5.
Comparison with Prop. n◦4 illustrates how the introduction of property rights,
in other words how decentralizing investment decisions, constrained the possible
investment outcomes. It obviously captures most of the inefficiency previously
discussed. Only when σ = 1 is the social planner in a position to implement the
first-best asset allocation for any values of the parameters. For σ 6= 1, she will
only be able to reach the first-best investments for limited ranges of parameters,
that is under the first-best no-investment threshold (no investment) and over
the second-best, or decentralized, full-investment threshold (full investment).
Both too much and not enough complementarity between the two assets may
be a source of inefficiency, and constrain the feasible investments.
Comparison of Fig. n◦5 with Fig. n◦1 illustrates that A’s program entails
one additional source of inefficiency relative to the program of a production-
maximizing social planner: he is sometimes in a position to increase his utility
at the cost of some overall production. For σ > 1 and ΓB low enough (B’s
asset is not so profitably invested), A would offer B a lower share than the
social planner would.12 B’s investment is therefore suboptimal from the social
planner’s point of view.
Finally, when a range of αs generate the same investment strategies (in this
instance, this occurs only for the full-investment case), while the social planner
may be indifferent over redistributive issues, A obviously is not, and maximizes
his own share.
12In fact, for σ > 2, there is even a range of parameters in which A would keep the whole
proceeds of the common endeavor for himself (αA = 1), thus effectively excluding B from the
formal sector. The cost of attracting A’s investment would be higher than the gains.
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3 The political model
3.1 The stakes of political power
For the reasons just outlined (low profitability of the investment of one asset,
redistributive issues), A and B often do not set the same sharing rules.13 While
for a given state of the world A would set αA = (αAA, α
A
B), B favors α
B =
(αBA , α
B
B) and would set it if in power. Notice that B’s program is exactly
symmetrical to A’s in the (ΓA,ΓB)-plane. The indirect utilities resulting from
such sharing rules are VA(α
A) and VB(α
A) on the one hand, VA(α
B) and VB(α
B)
on the other. Let me define vA = VA(α
A)−VA(αB) and vB = VB(αB)−VB(αA):
since αi maximizes Vi, vi is necessarily nonnegative. These scalars fully capture
the economic value for A and B of obtaining control over the sharing rule, the
stakes of competition for political power.
Prop. 4. Complementarity and propensity for conflict:
The stakes of political competition are higher for more substitutable assets.
In other words, vA and vB are nondecreasing in σ:
∀k ∈ {A,B}, dvk
dσ
≥ 0.
Prop. n◦4 is key in addressing the question raised in this paper: why different
activities, even if they are similarly efficient, can have vastly different political
economic outcomes. Mineral extraction, in particular, is associated with high
returns and low complementarity between individuals in a position to manage
it. As a consequence, there is little incentive to redistribute widely its proceeds,
which raises the stakes of controlling the extractive process. As already men-
tioned in the introduction, Prop. n◦4 is intuitive once the true nature of the
complementary of substitutable assets has been grasped. If A is in power, he
will find it more profitable to involve B in the common productive endeavor if
their assets are complementary rather than substitutes, and as a consequence,
he is likely to offer him a higher share of its proceeds. If B is in power, the
reasoning is similar. As a consequence, when σ decreases, one expects the gap
between the two alternative sharing rules to diminish, thus reducing the stakes
of political power. For all the simplicity of the idea, the proof is rather tedious,
but it can be found in the appendix.
Finally, the cross-derivatives of d
2vA
dσdγ and
d2vB
dσdγ are positive. Profitability and
substitutability are both at the heart of the possible conflict between A and B,
and they tend to reinforce one another as factors of discord.
3.2 Political competition
So far, the model does not include a mechanism to select who gets to decide.
I model political competition as a contest game. Each contestant k provides
an outlay bk in order to win a prize. The prize is here the utility gain he
would derive from setting the sharing rule, rather than the other setting it. The
probability of him winning increases with his own outlay and decreases with
13In fact, that A and B sometimes DO set the same sharing rules is only an artifact of this
model. It is a consequence of the frequency of corner solutions, a necessity if the model is to
be solved, but it should not be further interpreted.
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the other’s. Outlays are sunk costs, which can be considered as pledges on the
future proceeds of the common productive endeavor on financial markets (which
are not explicitly modeled).
An extensive literature has identified numerous contest success functions (the
technology that translates the individual efforts into probabilities of winning the
contest). The most common are the perfect discrimination (the highest outlay
wins) and the Tullock contest.14 Both settings offer the same insight: Tullock
(1980); Hillman and Riley (1989) have previously shown that equilibrium outlays
(b∗A, b
∗
B) increase with the value of the prize, indeed that individual outlays
increase as each individual values the prize more.15 Thanks to Prop. n◦4, the
second result immediately follows:
Prop. 5. Complementarity and actual conflict:
The intensity of the conflict for political power decreases with the comple-
mentarity of the assets. In other words, bA and bB are nondecreasing in σ:
∀k ∈ {A,B}, db
∗
k
dσ
≥ 0.
Even though the gains from setting the sharing rule, vA and vB , cannot
formally be labeled as a political rent, they have the same intuitive characteris-
tics: they are benefits from being in power which are not linked to any activity
beneficial to the economy as a whole. On the contrary, they are extracted at
the cost of reaching a suboptimal level of production. It is therefore useful to
think of them as a rent derived from political power. Another way to formulate
Prop. n◦5, therefore, is that higher substitutability results into more rent dissi-
pation. While Prop. n◦4 made clear that the political rent decreased with the
complementarity of the assets, Prop. n◦5 concludes that indeed conflictuality
(seen here as the amount of effort spent in the political contest) decreases with
the complementarity of assets.
The cross-derivatives
d2b∗A
dσdγ and
d2b∗B
dσdγ are positive: as before, profitability and
substitutability tend to reinforce one another as factors of conflicts. Let me also
mention that the contest technology and the degree of asymmetry between the
stakes of power may also affect the intensity of the conflict. This is however not
central to this analysis.
4 Property rights institutions
I have so far assumed that once set, any sharing rule is enforced with certainty.
The individual in power never reneged on his offer once production had taken
place. In other words, I have implicitly assumed perfect protection from the pre-
dation of the state. Meanwhile, there is a growing consensus among economists,
that expropriation by the government or powerful elites is a decisive hindrance
to development. Checks against state predation – in other words, institutions
14Player i provides an outlay bi with probability of winning
bri
br
A
+br
B
. Parameter r > 0
characterizes the contest technology, with increasing returns (high r) or decreasing returns
(low r).
15They provide explicit expressions of the outlays. Those depend on the contest technology,
on the asymmetry between the stakes for each player. Moreover, given the asymmetry and
the technology, outlays are proportional to one’s stake in the contest.
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of property rights protection – have indeed been shown to be good predictors of
long run economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002b; Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2005).16 While the previous section examined the political features of
a simple productive framework, this one relaxes the assumption of perfect prop-
erty rights or, equivalently, of effective enforcement of the sharing rule. These
two sections are independent. From now on, one individual is assumed to be in
power; how he reached that position is of no consequence.17
Assume A is in power. He cannot be counted upon to meet his commitment
once production has taken place. In other words, there is no property rights
protection. B expects that whatever A’s offer he will in fact get nothing. With-
out credible enforcement of the sharing rule, there can therefore be no common
production.
Assume now B expects A to maybe renege on the initial offer (partial prop-
erty rights protection): with probability p, he gets only his own specific pro-
duction, and with probability 1− p the sharing rule is effectively enforced. This
situation corresponds for instance to an uncertain judicial or political environ-
ment: A may be able to corrupt the judge or the politician (but he cannot count
upon successfully doing so), or maybe the enforcement scheme is itself found
lacking. Such a scheme can also rely on an exterior third actor, such as in the
case of conditional development aid: in that case reneging on the contract may
provoke the interruption of financial disbursements and thus entail immediately
adverse consequences in terms of A’s utility. Anyway, a high p means poor
property rights enforcement, and a low p good property rights. If A offers the
sharing rule αAr = (αArA , α
Ar
B ) (r standing for ‘reneging’), B gets an expected
share of (1− p)αArB , and A (1− p)αArA + p.
Let me now assume that it is possible to invest in the commitment capacity
of the state. Formally, the state commits to restrain itself from predation. To
increase the credibility of the professed sharing rule, A reduces the likelihood of
himself reneging by investing in an external commitment mechanism. To reach
a level p, he pays a cost C(p), nondecreasing: a higher commitment involves
higher costs. This typically corresponds to the cost of an independent judicial
system, but one could also imagine other schemes: for instance, conditional
development aid associates a cost with a breach of the property rights, which
is likely to reduce the incentive for the state to renege.18 Formally, his full
program can thus be written:
max
αrA,α
r
B ,xA,p
UA(xA, xB , α
r
A)− C(p)
s.t.

αrA ∈ [0, 1]
αrB = 1− αrA
p ∈ [0, 1]
xB = x
∗
B ((1− p)αrB , xA)
(5)
16This consensus reaches beyond the academic community. The usual governance or in-
vestment climate indicators provided by international financial institutions all rely on state
predation in their definitions.
17In particular, I do not examine how the prospect of having to invest in property rights
institutions may affect the stakes of winning the contest game introduced in the previous
section.
18Conditional aid would be best accounted for, however, by a liability contingent upon
reneging. The results would not substantially differ.
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A would set αAr such that it maximizes VA((1 − p)α + p). Let me write
αA the sharing rule he would have implemented under perfect property rights
protection (as derived from Prop. n◦1). Whenever possible, he would set αAr =
(
αAA−p
1−p ,
αAB
1−p ). With no constraint on the sharing rules, partial property rights
protection entails uncertainty on the utilities of the players, but A’s could still
fully compensate B. He expectedly reaches the same outcome as with perfect
property rights protection: V rA(p) = Vi(α
i
i) (constant in p). A’s final valuation
can be written WA(p) = V
r
A(p)− C(p).
The model, however, rests on the assumption that the specific productions
of each individual cannot be taxed or otherwise captured. In other words, the
liability of A and B is limited to their participation in the common endeavor.
No sharing rule outside [0, 1] can be offered credibly. A’s program can thus be
simplified into:
max
p∈[0,1]
WA(p) (6)
Suppose αAA ≥ p, then A can offer B αArB ∈]0, 1]: he is able to fully com-
pensate him for his own inability to commit.19 Now suppose αAA < p, i cannot
offer αArB > 1. He can possibly offer α
Ar
B = 1: he retains ownership of the com-
mon endeavor if he successfully reneges, with probability p, and relinquishes
everything if he does not, with probability 1 − p. Possibly if p is high enough
the resulting investment leaves A worse off than if he retained the full common
production, even at the cost of B’s participation. Let me define p the threshold
above which V rA(p) ≤ V rA(αArA = 0) = VA(αAA = 0). Notice that p is possibly 1.
V rA, considered as a function of p, is nonincreasing, constant equal to VA(α
A
A)
for p ≤ αAA, constant equal to VA(1) for p ≥ p, and decreasing in between. It
is continuous everywhere. As expected, a higher p has therefore an increasingly
adverse impact on A’s utility. Fig. n◦6 illustrates the sharing rule resulting
from A’s inability to commit, and the utility he derives from it. The set of
the Nash investment equilibria feasible for a given set of parameters is a subset
of those which were previously derived with perfect property rights protection;
some equilibria, however, may not be feasible any more.
WA is increasing in p over [0, α
A
A] and over [p, 1]. It is not necessarily mono-
tonic in between. Once in power, A sets p∗A ∈ [αAA, p] ∪ {1} as the maximand of
Wi. It is possible that he has no incentive to invest in such a scheme (resulting
in p∗A = 1); but it is not hard to see that any choice outside that set would be
dominated by another within it. p∗A can be interpreted as the optimal static
level of property rights protection from A’s point of view, once the cost of in-
vesting in the commitment mechanism is taken into account. My third and last
result focuses on this optimal level of property rights protection:
Prop. 6. Contract-enforcing institutions and complementarity
The political leader’s investment in property rights institutions increases with
the complementarity of assets. In other words p∗A and p
∗
B are nondecreasing in
σ:
∀k ∈ {A,B}, dp
∗
k
dσ
≥ 0.
19Agents are risk neutral; risk-averse agents would request a risk premium as a compensation
for the insecurity of the sharing rule, which would only reinforce the mechanism under scrutiny.
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Figure 6: A’s optimal offer with imperfect commit-
ment (left) and his resulting utility (right), as func-
tions of p.
An individual in power has a higher incentive to commit (lower p∗i ) to up-
holding his sharing rule offer for more complementary assets (lower σ), and is
therefore more willing to invest in a costly p-reducing scheme. He expects to
profit from the additional investment it would induce from the other. Notice
that the mechanism which is highlighted here is not only very intuitive, it is also
static (the proof makes an argument similar to that of Topkis’s theorem). The
dynamic dimension of investment in state capacity brings additional insights
which I do not address here, such as the link between investment in state capac-
ity and the risk of losing power (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2009, 2010; Besley
and Persson, 2010); but a static framework is enough to provide interesting
insights.
5 Country case studies
The previous theoretical results offer new insights into the stylized facts men-
tioned in the introduction: mineral resources tend to be associated with more
conflict (one major factor behind the resource curse) and with less state capac-
ity. A secondary puzzle of Barro (1991)’s cross-country growth regressions is
the astonishing development of some countries, such as Botswana and Mauri-
tius which, based on their demographical and geographical characteristics, on
their resource endowments, and on average development outcomes in compa-
rable countries, should have remained poor and marred by civil conflicts. Not
only did they achieve very high and sustained levels of growth since their in-
dependence, but all indicators of governance, competitiveness, and democracy
position them in the top spots in Africa. To the day, there has been very
few successful attempts to explain the peculiarity of these success-stories (Silve,
2012, provides a review of the literature on both countries, and offers a more
detailed assessment of their success); the three theoretical results of this paper
shed some light on some factors that underline their seemingly odd development
trajectories.
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5.1 Mauritius
Mauritius is a densely populated, fertile island in the Indian Ocean, with no
known mineral resources. At independence, in 1968, its economy was among the
poorest of the world, with a central role of sugar cultivation, which represented
as much as 20% of its GDP and 60% of export receipts. Commissioned by the
government of Mauritius to study the development prospects of the country,
Meade (1961) pointed that ethnic heterogeneity would prove the most important
obstacle to growth, and indeed, even though recent studies have nuanced this
view, this intuition has been largely confirmed (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).
Sugar cultivation and textile production were the two very profitable sec-
tors instrumental in initiating forty years of very dynamic average growth in
Mauritius. These productive sectors / common endeavors were unskilled labor-
intensive, and thus displayed a high complementarity between different groups
of workers. Mauritius managed to grow fast for a long time and to avoid the so-
cial conflicts that some believed would be inevitable in such an ethnically diverse
polity. Other countries with similar endowments are not particularly prone to
conflicts either; Mauritius managed to grow faster than them, though, thanks
to the exceptionally favorable terms it was granted in the sugar sector by the
Lome´ convention, and in the textile sector by the Multi Fibre Agreement. The
following steps of the Mauritian development are well-known: tourism, export-
processing zone, offshore business and finally an outsourcing industry were all
characterized by a high complementarity between workers. In this context, eth-
nic diversity had no reason to be a hindrance to political stability and economic
prosperity. Prop. n◦4 predicts the political conflict entails low stakes, Prop.
n◦5 that the conflict was unlikely to become violent, and Prop. n◦6 that com-
plementarity would be an incentive to invest in the regulatory capacity of the
state. How do those predictions compare to the facts?
First, growth in Mauritius has remained very inclusive over the years, and as
a result inequalities are low from an international perspective. Second, accord-
ing to the Economic Intelligence Unit, a London-based company within The
Economist Group which publishes an index of democracy around the world,
Mauritius is ranked first in Africa for the quality of its democratic process,
on par with most OECD countries. Power was already peacefully transferred
several times between competing political parties since independence, a unique
achievement among countries in Africa and in the Indian Ocean. Third, promi-
nent indicators of institutional quality (Doing Business and World Governance
Indicators of the World Bank, Global Competitiveness indicator of the World
Economic Forum and the Ibrahim index of governance) all position Mauritius
within the first three spots in Africa. Overall, this country is a perfect illustra-
tion of how complementary assets tend to generate a peaceful development and
good regulatory institutions.
5.2 Botswana
Botswana is a landlocked country in Southern Africa, largely covered by the
Kalahari desert, with abundant diamond resources discovered after indepen-
dence (in 1966). Diamonds in Botswana were found in kimberlite pipes, in other
words in mines (Orapa, Jwaneng, Letlhakane, Damtchaa), very early shown to
be among the most important in the world. Point-source resources are often
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quoted as the surest predictor of the resource-curse (for a recent review of the
resource curse literature, see van der Ploeg, 2011); relative to its neighbors with
alluvial diamonds, such as DRC, all factors pointed toward violent conflict. Yet
Botswana has been able to successfully transform its huge diamond wealth into
a stable democracy and an impressive growth record over the past forty years,
a unique achievement among diamond-rich countries.
That is not to say that there was no potential for conflict in Botswana.
Indeed diamonds did raise the stakes of political competition, as Prop. n◦4
predicts. Inequalities there are among the highest in the world, and the ethnic
minority remains extremely poor to the day20 (the population of Botswana is
small and relatively homogeneous: 79% describe themselves as belonging to the
Tswana ethnic group). Moreover, democracy in Botswana, even though never
caught out, is often described as “flawed”, as it has never been tested by a
majority change. Why outright conflict did not erupt in Botswana, however,
remains apparently paradoxical at this stage.
What differentiated Botswana from its neighbors stems from the economic
structure of the society at the time of independence. Seretse Khama had been
the heir to the customary chiefship, wealthiest and most powerful among the
leading class of cattle-owners in Bechuanaland; he had renounced his customary
rights in order to negotiate Botswana’s independence from the British colonial
power, and he had been elected with an overwhelming majority president of the
newly independent Botswana. Finally, the lands where diamonds had been dis-
covered were under his authority, yet he had nationalized them.21 In no other
country were so much evidence gathered to support the rights of one group to
manage the extraction of one resource and indeed, the political party he had
formed remains in power to this day in Botswana. One essential assumption
of Prop. n◦5 is that two individuals who compete in the political arena are
also those in a position to mobilize resources (or to solve the collective action
problem). This assumption is not very far-fetched, as political competition is
here modeled as having only economic stakes; but it is far-reaching. In newly
independent Botswana, as in Norway or the US when they discovered oil, there
was virtually no economic or political actor in a position to dispute the legit-
imacy of the state, neither internal nor external. This is quite obvious in the
case of more advanced nations, and the evidence gathered shows that it was
also the case in Botswana. Conflict remained exclusively democratic, and never
became violent, thanks to the absence of any contender in a position to mobi-
lize resources for conflict. In other countries, where a contender could arise, the
result was systematically violent civil conflict.
Lastly, Prop. n◦6 is not interestingly illustrated by the history of Botswana.
The origins of the development of the state’s regulatory capacity (previously
mentioned indicators of institutional quality all position Botswana just behind
Mauritius, in the top spots in Africa) should rather be attributed to a dynamic
view of state capacity building. The unlikelihood of losing power was certainly
decisive in the decision by the authorities to invest in a regulatory framework
which often tops African rankings (cf. Bourguignon and Verdier, 2009, 2010;
20Income inequalities are the only measurable inequalities. This picture would ideally need
to be nuanced to take into account non-income redistribution, for instance through a reputable
health care system.
21Khama’s legitimacy was further reinforced by several factors which are best described in
Acemoglu et al. (2002a).
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Besley and Persson, 2010)
6 Conclusion
Mineral extraction is indeed, in this paper’s perspective, a common productive
endeavor characterized by high substitutability and, in times of high market
prices, high profitability. I have provided a mechanism whereby abundant min-
eral resources tend to be associated with more frequent and more violent con-
flicts, and a new intuition for why mineral-rich countries did not develop good
property rights institutions and, more generally, regulatory state capacity. Po-
litical competition is essentially motivated by the gain of sharing the proceeds of
the common production according to one’s own interests, a gain which is lower
when the productive assets are more complementary. Since conflicts are costly,
and even possibly destructive, it is fair to assume that this mechanism offers
one more explanation to the resource curse.
This mechanism extends to encompass any kind of activity, which it charac-
terizes by the level of complementarity it implies between productive resources.
The history of Mauritius illustrated how labor-intensive activities, with high
complementarity within initially abundant unskilled labor, promote inclusive
growth, a peaceful democratic process and good property rights institutions.
On the contrary, diamond extraction in Botswana did raise the stakes of po-
litical competition, which did not develop into civil conflict thanks to a very
centralized polity. One implicit assumption, that of the economic structure of
society, has been key throughout that paper, and should be further explored:
individuals who compete in the political arena are also those in a position to
mobilize resources. It allowed me to differentiate diamond-rich Botswana from
countries with similar endowments, and it explained why, even though ethnic
division had been thought to be a very likely source of conflict and a major
impediment to growth in Mauritius, a peaceful polity naturally arose.
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Appendix
A Feasible investments (proof of Lemma n◦1)
If there exists an α such that ηAηB ≥ 1, then investment in the common en-
deavor by both asset holders is feasible (use Fig. n◦1 for an illustration). Let
me define the function g(αA) =
∑
k Γkα
σ−1
k : when σ > 1 (resp. σ < 1), I have
ηAηB ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ g(αA) ≥ 1 (resp. ≤). For σ 6= 2, the interior extremum of g is(∑
k Γ
1
2−σ
k
)2−σ
, reached for αA =
Γ
1
σ−2
B∑
k Γ
1
2−σ
k
. For σ = 2, g is a straight line and
has no interior extremum.
∀k ∈ {A,B}, xk = Rk is attained for α such that 1ηA ≤ RBRA ≤ ηB . There
exists such an α iff
∑
k
βk
Γk
1
σ−1 ≤ 1.{
xi < Ri
xj = Rj
is reached for α such that both ηAηB ≥ 1 (some production is
feasible) and ηi <
Ri
Rj
(production would involve partial investment of i’s asset):
• the first condition defines the empty set when σ < 1 iff ∑k Γ 1σ−2k > 1,
when σ ∈ {1, 2} iff ∑k Γ 1σ−2k < 1, and when σ > 2 iff ∀k,Γk < 1. If it
does not, it defines a range with bounds [α1, α2]. α1/2 are the (ordered)
solutions to equation g(α) = 1 when they exist, and respectively 0 and 1
when the corresponding solution does not;
• the second condition defines the range
[
0,max[ βkΓk
1
σ−1 , 1]
]
.
The latter conditions fully characterize feasible investments and are therefore
sufficient to prove Lemma n◦1.
B A’s program (proof of Prop. n◦1)
Let me first compute the utility derived by A for any given sharing rule α =
(αA, αB) in the various resulting equilibria.
When the sharing rule induces no investment, the resulting utilities are:
x∗∗A = 0
x∗∗B = 0
}
←→ ∀k, Vk = γkRk. (B.1)
When the sharing rule induces full investment, A’s resulting utility is:
VA(α) = αAγ
[∑
k
µkR
σ−1
σ
k
] σ
σ−1
where VA grows with αA. The binding constraint for A while in that situation
is therefore the threshold between B fully and partially investing his asset, in
which case:
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αA = 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
←→
 VA = γ
(∑
k µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1 − γBRBβB
VB =
γBRB
βB
.
(B.2)
When the sharing rule induces
{
x∗∗A = ηARB < RA
x∗∗B = RB
, A’s resulting utility
is:
VA(α) = γARA + γBRBΓ
1
σ−1
B
αA
(1− ΓAασ−1A )
1
σ−1
.
which grows with αA. If
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
is feasible, A always favors it; otherwise,
his binding constraint is ηAηB ≥ 1: when σ < 2 he sets α = (α2, 1− α2); when
σ > 2, he set α = (α1, 1−α1). Using the properties of α1/2, the utilities derived
can be written:
αA = α1/2
x∗∗A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
←→
{
VA = γARA + γBRB
α1/2
1−α1/2
VB =
γBRB
ΓB(1−α1/2)σ−1 .
(B.3)
Notice that
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
may be simultaneously feasible; in that case I still
have to compare A’s derived utilities in both situations.
When the sharing induces
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = ηBRA < RB
, A’s resulting utility is.
VA(α) = γARA
αAΓ
1
σ−1
A
(1− ΓBασ−1B )
σ
σ−1
,
which is not always monotonic in αA anymore: by increasing his own share,
A also reduces B’s investment. Additionally, I have to take into consideration
ranges of implementation which are not necessarily convex anymore. V ′A(αA)
has the same sign as 1− ΓB(1− αA)σ−2(1 + αA(σ − 1)). I need to distinguish
several cases.
If
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = ηBRA < RB
, σ < 2 and ΓB > 1, VA can be defined by exten-
sion over ]1 − 1ΓB
1
σ−1 , 1] over which it is decreasing: A would therefore set the
minimum αA available, thus coming back to the
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
equilibrium.
If
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = ηBRA < RB
, σ < 2 and ΓB < 1, VA can be defined by extension
over [0, 1]. It increases from 0 in 0 until it reaches a maximum, then it de-
creases until it reaches γARAΓ
1
σ−1
A in 1. The investment equilibrium would be
implemented for αA in the following ranges
• [α1, 1] when ΓA > 1 and 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 < βAΓA
1
σ−1 < α1,
• [α1, α2] when ΓA < 1 and 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 < βAΓA
1
σ−1 < α1,
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• [1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , 1] when ΓA > 1 and α1 <
βA
ΓA
1
σ−1 < 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , and
• [1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , α2] when ΓA < 1 and α1 <
βA
ΓA
1
σ−1 < 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 < α2.
V ′A(1 − βBΓB
1
σ−1 ) has the same sign as 1 − βB(σ − 1) − σΓBβ
σ−1
σ−1
B . Therefore if
ΓB ≥ 1−βB(σ−1)
σβ
σ−2
σ−1
B
, A is sure to set αA = α1 in the two former cases, and to come
back to the
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
equilibrium in the two latter. This condition provides
a upper limit on the values of ΓB for which A would not find it profitable to
induce as much investment from B as possible under the constraint that he
invests all his own asset. For ΓB under a value lower than that limit, he is going
to offer an intermediate sharing rule, implicitly defined by α = (αM , 1 − αM )
such that ΓB(1− αM )σ−2 (1 + αM (σ − 1)) = 1.
If
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = ηBRA < RB
, σ > 2 and ΓB > 1, VA can be defined by extension
over ]1− 1ΓB
1
σ−1 , 1]. It decreases first, then increases. Consequently, I need only
compare the value of VA for the lower and upper bound the range of α which
implement this equilibrium:
• [1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , α1] when ΓA < 1 and
βA
ΓA
1
σ−1 < 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 < α1,
• [1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , α1] ∪ [α2, 1] when ΓA > 1 and βAΓA
1
σ−1 < 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 < α1,
• [1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , 1] when βAΓA
1
σ−1 < 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 and α1 and α2, if they exist, are
inferior to βAΓA
1
σ−1 ,
• [α2, 1] when α1 < 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 < βAΓA
1
σ−1 < α2.
VA(α1)
VA(1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 )
=
βA
ΓA
1
σ−1
1− βBΓB
1
σ−1
βA
ΓAα
σ−1
1
is lower than 1 in the first range, where con-
sequently A comes back to the
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
equilibrium. In the second range
VA(1)
VA(1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 )
=
β
σ
σ−1
A
1− βBΓB
1
σ−1
is higher than 1 for high values of σ and βA and
for ΓB <
1−βA
(1−β
σ
σ−1
A )
σ−1
: if investing B’s asset is not profitable enough, A will
not involve him in the common endeavor at all; if it is profitable enough, A
comes back to the
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
equilibrium. In the third range, the same con-
siderations remain mostly true. In the fourth range, VA(1)VA(α2) = Γ
σ
σ−1
A α
σ−1
2 , an
expression which decreases with ΓA from 1 when ΓA = 1. Therefore, in that
range, A would prefer αA = α2. In that last range, A still needs to choose be-
tween α2, which leads to
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B =< RB
, and α1, which leads to
{
x∗∗A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
The frontier between the two decisions can be implicitly given by:
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βA
βB
σ
σ−1
=
ΓAα
σ−1
2
ΓB(1− α2)σ−1
(
ΓAα
σ−1
1
ΓB(1− α1)σ−1
) 1
σ−1
. (B.4)
If
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = ηBRA < RB
, σ > 2 and ΓB < 1, VA is defined over αA ∈ [max[1−
βB
ΓB
1
σ−1 , α2], 1]. If ΓB ≤ (σ−1)
2σ−3
σσ−1(σ−2)σ−2 , then VA increases over [0, 1], and if ΓB
is under another threshold (higher than the previous one), then VA increases
until it reaches a local maximum, decreases until it reaches a local minimum,
then increases again until it reaches its absolute maximum in 1: in both cases A
sets αA=1. Over the latter threshold, VA increases until it reaches its absolute
maximum, decreases until it reaches a local minimum, and increases again. At
the lower bound of the interval, it is decreasing: A has again to choose between
α2 and 1, or between 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 and 1. In each case, the frontier is at the same
level.
The previous analysis uniquely determines all A’s program, and the resulting
useful utilities are (I do not present αM ):
αA = α1/2
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
←→
 VA =
γARA
ΓAα
σ−1
1/2
VB = γBRB + γARA
1−α1/2
α1/2
(B.5)
αA = 1
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
←→
{
VA = γµ
σ
σ−1RA
VB = γBRB
(B.6)
C First-best asset allocation (proof of Prop. n◦2)
Two properties of the production function are useful: Y −∑k γkRk is homoge-
neous of degree 1 and concave (P1), and if xi 6= 0, lim
xj→0
∂j 6=if = +∞ (P2). If
the social planner invests anything, I know that she invests fully at least one
asset (P1). Suppose B’s asset is fully invested, then A’s is at least partly in-
vested (P2), and possibly fully invested. I have four situations to consider: no
investment, full investment, full investment of B’s asset and partial investment
of A’s and conversely.
Let me first determine a condition for the social planner to implement no
investment. I turn to polar coordinates: I define (ρ, θ) such that xA = ρ cos θ
and xB = ρ sin θ, and I consider the slope of Y along a ray indexed by θ:
dY
dρ (θ) = γ(µA cos(θ)
σ−1
σ + µB sin(θ)
σ−1
σ )
σ
σ−1 − γA cos(θ) − γB sin(θ). Since Y
is concave (strictly since σ > 0), and since Y ′(0) = +∞ and Y ′(pi2 ) = −∞,
dY
dρ (θ) reaches its maximum in ]0,
pi
2 [. The social planner would not invest in
the common endeavor iff this maximum slope along a ray is negative. I only
need to determine a condition for this maximum slope to be equal to 0. That
condition is that there exists a θ for which dYdρ (θ) = 0 and
d2Y
dρdθ (θ) = 0. I obtain
that such a θ verifies tan(θ) = (γAµBγBµA )
σ. Finally, the social planner invests no
asset in the common endeavor iff ΓA + ΓB < 1.
Notice that for the social planner to invest any asset, she must have found
that maxk
Γk
βk
≥ 1. Suppose Γi ≥ βi but Γj < βj , and suppose i’s asset is
26
invested only partially. (P1) ensures that j’s must be fully invested, which is
not possible. Therefore if asset i is such that Γi ≥ βi, it must be fully invested.
The social planner fully invests both assets iff mink
Γk
βk
≥ 1. Lastly, consider
a situation where i’s asset is fully invested and j’s only partially. The social
planner maximizes Y (xj) and thus invests x
FB
j =
(
µi
µj
Γj
1−Γj
) σ
σ−1
Ri.
D Second-best (proof of Prop. n◦3)
The social planner is able to reach the first best solution only for
∑
k Γk < 1
(she is in fact not at liberty of doing otherwise) and for
∑
k
βk
Γk
1
σ−1 ≤ 1, in which
range
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
is feasible and is her desired outcome (in that case, she
may have a range of α leading to it: she has no preference between different
sharing rules).
When she is not, two cases may arise. First, if only one non-(0,0) situation
is feasible, the social planner chooses α so as to maximize the investment of
the partially invested asset under the condition that the other asset remains
invested (ηAηB ≥ 1). The condition is binding. If σ > 2, ηAηB = 1 can only
have exactly one solution. Depending on σ ≶ 2 and A/B’s partial investment,
that solution is unambiguously α1/2.
Second,
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
and
{
x∗∗A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
may be simultaneously feasible
while
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
is not. This can only happen when σ > 2,∀k,Γk ≥ 1,
and g(α) = 1 has two solutions. The regulator would induce full investment
by B by choosing α ≤ α1, and by A by choosing α ≥ α2. If she chooses the
former, following the same reasoning as before, she would set α = α1, and the
latter, α = α2. Among those two possibilities, she chooses according to which
maximizes Y . Equality between the alternative productions provides an implicit
equation of the frontier between the two ranges of implementation:
βA
βB
σ
σ−1
=
(
ΓAα
σ−1
2
ΓB(1− α1)σ−1
) σ
σ−1 1−∑k Γkασ1
1−∑k Γkασ2 . (D.1)
E Complementarity and the stakes of political
competition (proof of Prop. n◦4)
I superimpose A’s program over B’s. In several situations, there is indeed
no conflict, as the best offer that the other can make in his own interest is
identical to what one would have offered. There are however several other
situations where there is some conflict over the sharing rule. Since the ranges
of parameters are unambiguous, I will distinguish the cases by αA and αB . I
have seven such situations. I present here the computations for three; the four
other cases are: αA = (α2, 1 − α2) and αB = (0, 1); αA = (αM , 1 − αM ) and
αB = (α1, 1 − α1); αA = (1, 0) and αB = (α2, 1 − α2); and αA = (1, 0) and
αB = ( βAΓA
1
σ−1 , 1 − βAΓA
1
σ−1 ). I am grateful that the reader exonerates me of the
four remaining computations.
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As a preliminary, let me examine the evolution of α1,2 with respect to σ.
Using the definition of α1 and the implicit function theorem, I derive that:
dα1
dσ
= −
i ln
i
µi
+ (1− i) ln 1−iµj
(σ − 1)2(Γiασ−21 − Γj(1− α1)σ−2)
with i = Γiα
σ−1
1 . The numerator is always positive, while the denominator is
positive either for α1 when σ < 2 or for α2 when σ > 2, and negative conversely.
As a consequence, when σ > 2, α1 grows with σ, while α2 decreases; when σ < 2,
α1 decreases with σ while α2 decreases.
Lemma 2. The solutions of g(α) = 1 are such that:
• when σ > 2, dα1dσ > 0 and dα2dσ < 0,
• when σ < 2, dα1dσ < 0 and dα2dσ > 0.
When αA = (α1, 1− α1) and αB = (0, 1){
vA = γBRB
α1
1−α1
vB = γBRB(Γ
1
σ−1
B − 1ΓB(1−α1)σ−1 ).
(E.1)
Since vA grows with α1, Lemma n
◦2 ensures that it grows with σ. Compu-
tations for vB are a bit more complex:
dvB
dσ
= γBRB
− ln(µA)Γ 1σ−1B
(σ − 1)2 −
 ln µ + (2− − α1 ) ln 1−µB
(σ − 1)(1− )(ΓAασ−21 − 1)

The first term inside the parentheses is evidently positive. The second term
needs more discussing. Notice first that ΓAα
σ−2
1 − 1 = (1 − α1)dg(α1)dαA < 0.
Second, for  > µA, ln
1−
µB
is negative. In that case, 2 −  − α1 < 2(1 − ).
Since  ln µA + 2(1− ) ln 1−µB > 0 for  > µA, I indeed obtain that in that case,
dvB
dσ > 0. Third, for  < µA, using Lemma n
◦2, I can rewrite dvBdσ as the sum of
three positive terms:
dvB
dσ
= γBRB
− ln(µA)Γ 1σ−1B
(σ − 1)2 −
 ln µA + (1− ) ln 1−µB
(σ − 1)(1− )(ΓAασ−21 − 1)
+
ln 1−µB
(σ − 1)(1− )
 .
As a conclusion, higher complementarity of assets makes it less valuable for
both A and B to be in power in that particular case, as in the following ones.
When αA = (1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , βBΓB
1
σ−1 ) and αB = (0, 1)
vA = γ
(∑
k µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1 (
1− βBΓB
σ
σ−1
)
− γARA
vB = γ
(∑
k µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
(
β
σ
σ−1
A − βBΓB
1
σ−1
) (E.2)
 dvAdσ = γ
(∑
k µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1 ∑
k βk ln
βk
µk
− βBΓB
σ
σ−1 ln µBΓB
dvB
dσ = −γRA ln(µA)(σ−1)2 − βBΓB
σ
σ−1 ln µBΓB
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Both expressions are the sum of two positive terms on the relevant ranges
of parameters, and are thus positive themselves.
When αA = (1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , βBΓB
1
σ−1 ) and αB = ( βAΓA
1
σ−1 , 1− βAΓA
1
σ−1 )
vA = vB = γ
(∑
k
µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
−
∑
k
γkRk
βk
= γ
(∑
k
µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
(
1−
∑
k
βk
Γk
1
σ−1
) (E.3)
dvA
dσ
=
dvB
dσ
=
γ
(∑
k µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
(σ − 1)2
∑
k
ζk ln
βk
µk
with ζi = βi +
σ−1
σ
(
βj
βi
Γi
1
σ−1 − βi βjΓj
1
σ−1
)
. Notice that ln
βj
µj
and ln βiµi are of
opposite sign. Since ζi ≥ βi, if βi ≥ µi
dvA
dσ
≥
γ
(∑
k µkR
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
(σ − 1)2
∑
k
βk ln
βk
µk
≥ 0.
The problem being symmetric between A and B, I extend this result to any
β and µ: dvAσ =
dvB
σ ≥ 0.
F Commitment and complementarity (proof of
Prop. n◦6)
WA increases in p over ]0, α
A
A] and over [p, 1]. Both V
r
A and C decrease in p
over [αAA(σ), p(σ)]. Therefore p
∗
A ∈ [αAA, p] ∪ {1}, as indicated in the main text.
There are four possibilities for any given σ: first, that it has a neighborhood in
which p∗A(σ) = α
A
A(σ) (the maximum remains locally stuck at the lower bound);
second, that it has a neighborhood in which p∗A(σ) = 1 (the maximum remains
locally stuck at 1); third, that A is indifferent between setting p∗A = 1 and
another value in [αAA(σ), p(σ)]; and fourth is the interior situation.
In the first possibility, A finds that the gains from commitment outweigh the
cost up to his optimal offer of sharing rule. Prop. n◦6 is locally equivalent to
his optimal offer increasing with complementarity, in other words, to
dαAA
dσ ≥ 0.
From Prop. n◦1, αAA can take four nontrivial values: 1− βBΓB
1
σ−1 , αM and α1/2.
Lemma n◦2 and simple computations show that these values increase with σ.
In the second possibility, Prop. n◦6 is locally trivial.
I cover the two latter possibilities by making an argument in the line of
Topkis’s theorem. To finish proving Prop. n◦6, I need only show that in
the noncorner case and to its right, WA is submodular, or equivalently, that
∀p ≥ αAA, d
2WA(p,σ)
dpdσ =
d2V rA(p,σ)
dpdσ ≤ 0. The noncorner case can never implement{
x∗∗A < RA
x∗∗B = RB
or
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B = RB
, since when these situations are feasible, I have
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shown in the proof of Lemma n◦1 that should A implement either, he would
always choose αAA at the upper bound of the implementability range. Therefore
p’s constraint can implement a noncorner
{
x∗∗A = RA
x∗∗B < RB
from which A derives
utility
pγRAµ
σ
σ−1
A(
1− γ(1−p)γB
σ−1
µσB
) σ
σ−1
. Writing x = γ(1−p)γB
σ−1
µσB , its cross-derivative is
γRA
(σ−1)2
µA
1−x
σ
σ−1
[(
1− σpx(1−p)(1−x)
)
ln 1−xµA +
σx
1−x
(
1− σpx+(σ−1)p(1−p)(1−x)
)
ln xµB −
σ(σ−1)2px
(1−p)(1−x)
]
.
The second factor of this expression can be written as the sum of negative terms
when p ≥ αAA.
Therefore, in all four possibilities, when σ increases, p∗A either increases
continuously or it “jumps” to an greater value, which concludes the proof of
Prop. n◦6.
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